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  Dividend yield plays an important role for decision-making in the stock market. Stock returns 
alone are informational content used by investors in financial analysis and forecasting. The 
purpose of the current study is to evaluate the effect of different types of notes and conditions 
on the performance audit report on the Tehran Stock Exchange over the period 2005-2011 for 
65 selected firms. We have used statistical tests to examine the effects of disagreement, 
restriction and ambiguity issued by auditors. The results show that there is no relationship 
between stock returns and audit reports provided and capital market does not respond to the 
audit report. This could be due to unfamiliarity with the terminology of the users of the audit 
report to be audited.  
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1. Introduction 
Most investors use financial reports to predict outlook and in case  auditors make some limitation or 
ambiguity in qualified audit report, they may take a closer look at reports especially when there are 
some correlations between conditions and firms’ returns (Craswell et al., 2000). Some of the 
warnings issued by auditors could be changed to some alarming news, which could influence 
financial statements, significantly. Balvers et al. (1988) investigated on underpricing of new issues 
and the choice of auditor as a signal of investment banker reputation.  Beattie and Fearnley (1995) 
studied the importance of audit firm characteristics and the drivers of auditor change in UK listed 
companies. Casterella et al. (2000) modeled the audit opinions issued to bankrupt companies based 
on a two-stage empirical analysis. Choi and Jeter (1992) investigated the impacts of qualified audit 
opinions on earnings response coefficients.  Lenard et al. (2001) presented a decision-making 
capabilities of a hybrid system applied to the auditor’s going-concern assessment.   564
According to Cullinan et al. (2012) many companies have learned to report positive information more 
quickly than they report negative news. They studied the potential impact of audit opinion change on 
the timeliness of financial disclosures, with improvements in audit opinion considered to be “good 
news.” They used both the direction and the magnitude of audit opinion change, with magnitude 
measuring how far the idea was from an unqualified opinion. They reported that firms experiencing 
an improvement in their audit opinions could disclose their financial results faster and these effects 
were associated with the magnitude of the opinion change. What's more, there was an asymmetric 
response to good audit opinion news vs. bad audit opinion news, with bad audit opinion news having 
a larger effect on earnings timeliness than the impact on earnings timeliness of good audit opinion 
news. Based on their survey, results support the “good news early, bad news late” notion. They 
concluded that overall earnings timeliness had improved in China since the enactment of new 
reporting regulations in 2006. 
Bhimani et al. (2009) investigated the impact of the independent auditor's going-concern evaluation 
by studying default following the release of the auditor's report. They implemented a proprietary 
sample maintained by the Portuguese Central Bank on 12,199 audit reports associated with nearly 
2000 firms, which were liable by law to have their accounts audited on an annual basis. Investigations 
on robustness across various asset classes, age, industries, and regions indicated that firms received a 
going-concern opinion on average default more than those that receive a clean opinion.  
Autore et al. (2009) investigated the relationship between information uncertainty and auditor 
reputation revealed by the failure of Arthur Andersen (AA). AA’s reputation deteriorated 
substantially when it announced on January 10, 2002, that it had shredded documents associated with 
its audit of Enron. Autore et al. (2009) reported that on these dates the clients of AA and other Big 
Five auditors that were characterized by higher information uncertainty experience larger share price 
declines compared with clients with lower information uncertainty. The findings recommended that 
the market relied more heavily on auditor reputation for higher information uncertainty firms, which 
implied that the value of an audit was greater when a firm was harder to value. Their results marked 
the importance of information uncertainty in financial markets: where there was a shock to auditor 
reputation, firms with greater information uncertainty could suffer the largest losses. 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) implemented internal control deficiency (ICD) disclosures before 
mandated internal control audits to study economic factors, which expose firms to control failures and 
managements’ incentives to discover and report control problems. They reported that, relative to non-
disclosers, firms disclosing ICDs had complex operations and organizational changes, bigger 
accounting risk, more auditor resignations and had fewer resources available for internal control.  
In this paper, we study the impacts of three kinds of notes on financial performances on some 
selected firms in Tehran Stock Exchange. The organization of this paper first presents details of the 
survey in section 2 and section 3 presents details of the hypotheses and the results. Finally, 
concluding remarks are given in the last to summarized the contribution of the paper.  
 2. The proposed method 
The proposed study of this paper considers selected firms whose stocks were actively traded over the 
period of 2005-2010 but we do not include holding firms and they must have equal fiscal year starting 
from March. In addition, any interruption in stocks’ trades must not take more than three months and, 
at least, the stock shares must be traded, at least, 70 business days and all necessary information must 
be publically available. Based on these conditions, we have selected 65 companies for this study. 
Table 1 shows some basic statistics associated with the data. 
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Table 1 
Basic statistics associated with firms some disagreements in their reports 
Firms’ return  min  max  mean  Std dev.  Skewness  Kurtosis 
With agreement  -8.61  12.79 41062 4.86 -0.11 0.41  -0.17 0.80
With disagreement  -15.92  7.90  0.92  4.69  -1.55  0.41  -0.18  0.80 
Number of observations = 32 
Table 2 
Basic statistics associated with firms some restricting conditions in their reports 
Firms’ return  min  max  mean  Std dev.  Skewness  Kurtosis 
Acceptable   -12.80  12.79  0.55  5.04  0.50  0.30  -1.92  0.97 
With some restrictions  -7.68  11.16 0.24 4.14 0.50 0.45  -1.56 0.80
Number of observations = 21 
Table 3 
Basic statistics associated with firms some vague remarks in their reports 
Firms’ return  min  max  mean  Std dev.  Skewness  Kurtosis
Acceptable   -12.80  12.79  0.55  5.04  0.50  0.30  -1.92  0.97 
With  vague  notes  -7.68  11.16 0.24  4.14  0.50 0.45 -1.56  0.80 
Number of observations = 12 
Based on the results of Tables 1-3, we can conclude that the number of firms received condition or 
restrictions have been reduced. However, we see a reduction in their returns as well. The proposed 
study of this paper investigates whether there is a difference between the returns of firms whose 
annual reports are accepted with no conditions and those whose annual reports are met with some 
disagreements, restrictions or some ambiguities. Next, we present details of hypotheses along with 
statistical observations. 
  
3. The results 
As explained earlier, we study the relationship between auditors’ concerns on financial reports.  
3.1. The first hypothesis: The relationship between disagreement and financial reports 
The first hypothesis of this survey is associated with disagreement issue in financial reports.  
0
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: There is no difference between the return of frims with no agreement and firms with some disagreements.
: There is a   difference between the return of frims with no agreement and firms with some d
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In our survey, Pearson correlation value is equal to 0.02 and p-value is equal to 0.91 when the number 
of observations is equal to 32. Therefore, we do not have enough evidence to believe that there is any 
difference between the return of two groups of firms and we can conclude that there is no difference 
between return of firms with no agreement and firms with some disagreements. Now, there are cases 
where some firms receive some disagreement and these issues are resolved in the following year.  
Table 4 
The results of testing the hypothesis: Difference between firms’ returns after disagreement is resolved 
using paired differences   
 Standard  Deviation  95%  Confidence  limit     
Mean Deviation  from  mean  Lower  limit   Upper limit  t-student  P-value 
1.14  6.69  1.18  -1.27  3.55  0.96  0.34 
Degree of freedom = 31 
   566
We wish to know whether there is any difference between the return of these firms when they receive 
disagreement and the return of these firms after one year when the disagreement is resolved. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis is that such difference does not exist. Table 4 demonstrates the results 
of our survey. As we can observe from the results of Table 4, we cannot reject the null hypothesis and 
conclude that the return could be improved when disagreement is resolved.  
3.2. The second hypothesis: The relationship between restriction issues and financial reports 
The second hypothesis of this survey is associated with restriction issue in financial reports.  
0
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: There is no difference between the return of frims with no restriction and firms with some restrictions.
: There is a   difference between the return of frims with no restriction and firms with som
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In our survey, Pearson correlation value is equal to -0.26 and p-value is equal to 0.23 when the 
number of observations is equal to 21. Therefore, we do not have enough evidence to believe that 
there is any difference between the return of two groups of firms and we can conclude that there is no 
difference between return of firms with no restrictions and firms with some restrictions.  
Now, there are cases where some firms receive some restrictions and these issues are resolved in the 
following year. We wish to know whether there is any difference between the return of these firms 
when they receive restrictions and the return of these firms after one year when the restriction is 
resolved. Therefore, the null hypothesis is that such difference does not exist. Table 5 demonstrates 
the results of our survey. 
Table 5 
The results of testing the hypothesis: Difference between firms’ returns after restriction is resolved 
using paired differences   
 Standard  Deviation  95%  Confidence  limit     
Mean  Deviation  from mean  Lower limit   Upper limit  t-student  P-value 
0.30  7.34  1.60  -3.03  3.64  0.19  0.85 
Degree of freedom = 20 
As we can observe from the results of Table 5, we cannot reject the null hypothesis and conclude that 
the return could be improved when restriction is resolved.  
3.3. The third hypothesis: The relationship between ambiguities and financial reports 
The third hypothesis of this survey is associated with the existence of some ambiguities in financial 
reports.  
0
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: There is no difference between the return of frims with no ambiguity and firms with some ambiguities.
: There is a   difference between the return of frims with no ambiguity and firms with some amb
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In our survey, Pearson correlation value is equal to 0.12 and p-value is equal to 0.71 when the number 
of observations is equal to 12. Therefore, we do not have enough evidence to believe that there is any 
difference between the return of two groups of firms and we can conclude that there is no difference 
between return of firms with no ambiguity and firms with some ambiguities. Now, there are cases 
where some firms receive some ambiguities and these issues are resolved in the following year. We 
wish to know whether there is any difference between the return of these firms when they receive 
ambiguities and the return of these firms after one year when the ambiguity is resolved. Therefore, 
the null hypothesis is that such difference does not exist. Table 6 demonstrates the results of our 
survey. 
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Table 6 
The results of testing the hypothesis: Difference between firms’ returns after ambiguity is resolved 
using paired differences  
 Standard  Deviation  95%  Confidence  limit     
Mean  deviation  from mean  Lower limit   Upper limit  t-student  P-value 
-0.82  2.92  0.84  -2.68  1.04  -0.97  0.35 
Degree of freedom = 31 
As we can observe from the results of Table 6, we cannot reject the null hypothesis and conclude that 
the return could be improved when ambiguity is resolved.  
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have presented an empirical study to measure the relationship between auditors’ 
concerns including disagreements, on financial performance. The first hypothesis of this survey is 
associated with disagreement issue in financial reports. Pearson correlation value was equal to 0.02 
and p-value was equal to 0.91 when the number of observations was equal to 32. Therefore, we did 
not have enough evidence to believe that there was any difference between the return of two groups of 
firms and concluded that there was no difference between return of firms with no agreement and firms 
with some disagreements.  
We also concluded that the return did not improve when disagreement was resolved in the following 
year. The second and the third hypotheses examined the impacts of restriction an ambiguity with 
returns and reached the same conclusion. In other words, we did not see any meaningful change on 
firms’ returns after these two issues are resolved.  
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